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Abstract
To accelerate the development of competition in gas markets, some European regulators (in United Kingdom or in
France) have decided to implement gas release programs. These programs compel the incumbent to sell gas that is
no longer sold to its customers to its competitors. A ﬁrst intuition would suggest that such a measure could give the
incumbent an incentive to let its own costs rise in order to raise its rival’s ones. With a duopoly model, we found some
cases where incentives to raise costs do exist but, in most of the cases there is no such incentives.
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1. INTRODUCTION
European Gas markets are opening slowly to competition. In order to accelerate the competition pace,
some European regulators decided to implement asymmetric regulations that most often combine market share
restrictions and gas release programs. Market share constraints are settled as a target market share by the
1We are very grateful to Pr. J. Percebois, L. Linnemer and J.C. Poudou for their helpful comments, ideas and discussions. The
usual caveat applies. The positions expressed in this paper are not oﬃcial positions of Gaz de France.
1regulator. Gas release programs can be implemented alone but they often accompany market share constraints.
It has been the case for the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy. Nonetheless, in France, Germany and Austria,
gas release programs have not accompanied committed market share reductions. As the incumbent has to lose
market shares, gas release programs compel the incumbent to sell gas that is no longer sold to its customers to
its competitors. A ﬁrst intuition concerning gas release program would suggest that such a measure, if it was
no time limited, could give the incumbent incentives to let the negotiated prices of its long term contracts rise
in order to raise its rivals’ cost.2
To question whether an incumbent has incentives to let its own costs rise in order to raise its rivals’ ones,
we consider an oligopoly market where participants compete in quantities. We concentrate on a duopoly case
where an incumbent has to provide its competitor with an input that cannot be got from another sources. This
input can be access to an essential facility for example. Within the framework of a gas release program, this
input is the gas molecule imported by the incumbent.
The case of a duopoly in which one of the competitors has an inﬂuence on its rivals’ cost has been widely
treated in economic literature. Few recent papers proposed this kind of model without capacity constraint.
Among the authors interested by this question, Economides (1998) looks for the incentives to raise its down-
stream rivals’ cost for a vertically integrated ﬁrm which is a monopolist on the input market. He shows that
incentives to raise rivals’ cost do exist but they are restricted to the rivals’ cost. If the cost of its downstream
subsidiary were also to be raised by the strategic decision of the upstream monopolist, the latter would not
implement this strategy. In other words, the integrated ﬁrm has no incentive to raise the whole industry cost.
In 2001, Weisman and Kang, starting from a similar model than the Economides’one, show that an integrated
ﬁrm has an incentive to raise its downstream rivals’ cost, when this ﬁrm is no less eﬃcient than these rivals.
These two models deal with non price discrimination, the monopolist can aﬀect the cost of its downstream
rivals with other means than the input price. Sibley and Weisman (1998) propose a model where a regulated
monopolist is subject to two contrary incentives. The ﬁrst one leads the upstream monopolist to raise its rivals’
costs in order to decrease competitor’s sells and to increase its own oﬀers and the price on the ﬁnal market.
But the second one leads it to decrease its rivals’ costs to increase competitor’s purchases on the intermediate
2The netback value is always used in European gas market. Thus, the incumbent can be limited to increase its cost to the extent
wanted. The gas price must stay competitive with others energy prices (fuel oil domestic).
2market. They show the ﬁrst eﬀect overcomes the second if incumbent’s market share is high enough.
Our approach is somewhat complementary to these ones in the sense that we consider a kind of integrated
ﬁrm where the upstream level is characterized by ﬁxed cost (long term contracts with take-or-pay clauses) and
the downstream level by a seller on the ﬁnal market. The upstream monopolist is compelled by the regulator
to oﬀer the input to its downstream rival at its unitary cost. So, in our model, the incumbent cannot raise
its rival cost by another way than the input price. As this input price is ﬁxed by the regulator to the price
supported by the upstream level, raising rival’s cost in our model means raising the cost of the whole industry.
Another feature of our model is the ﬁxed cost paid by the integrated ﬁrm whereas within Economides’ model,
for example, costs are variable. The speciﬁcity of our model allows us to catch the problem raised by gas release
programs implemented in Europe. We show that the integrated ﬁrm could have incentives to raise the whole
industry cost but these incentives are restricted to very speciﬁc cases where the input quantity hold by the
incumbent is quite low and the share of this quantity that it has to oﬀer to its competitor is quite high. Section
2 of our paper describes our model and the diﬀerent possible equilibriums and section 3 identiﬁes the incentives
for the incumbent to let unitary cost grow.
2. THE MODEL
Suppose an integrated ﬁrm that has bought a capacity Ko which unit cost is u. This capacity could be a
long term contract gas portfolio Ko which was negotiated previously. This integrated ﬁrm (the incumbent)
must oﬀer a proportion3 α ∈ [0,1] of its capacity Ko to its competitor on the downstream market at a price
r. The incumbent is an upstream monopolist in the sense that its competitor has no other available source of
supply. The regulator determines both α and r values. We suppose that r equals u.4 Variables Ko,α,u(and
thus r) are exogenous. European gas release experiences show that gas release prices are often set in line with
the incumbent’s importation costs. Few information are available on gas release proportion setting.
Let qo and qe the quantities respectively sold by the incumbent and its competitor.5
Our Cournot game has to deal with two constraints. The competitor (or gas release) constraint qe ≤ αKo
(C1), stipulates that it cannot sell a quantity higher than the one it got from the incumbent. The two operators
3We can suppose a ﬁxed released quantity like a proportion α but it does not change our results
4But our results hold if r = u +   with ε>0.
5We will indice by "o" variables related to the incumbent and by "e" those related to the competitor.
3cannot sell more than the incumbent’s supplies, in other words there is a market constraint that applies to both
operators : qe + qo ≤ Ko (C2).
The demand function of the ﬁnal market is a linear one, P(q)=1− q.6
The proﬁte x p r e s s i o n sa r e
Πo(qe,q o,r)=P(qe + qo)qo − uKo + rqe (1)
for the incumbent and
Πe(qe,q o,r)=P(qe + qo)qe − rqe (2)
for the competitor. The optimal quantities (and associated prices) must respect the two previous constraints.
The two operators simultaneously choose their strategies. They maximize their own proﬁts subject to the
two constraints. They try to play their best reply strategy to the other one’s strategy. If they cannot play it,






Πo(qo,q e,r)=P(q)qo − Kou + rqe
Max
qe





qe ≤ αKo (λe)
qe + qo ≤ Ko (µo,µ e)
Let λe be the multiplier value of the competitor constraint (C1). Taking into account the result of Breton
and Zaccour (2001), each ﬁrm has a multiplier value associated to C2.T h e ya r eµe for the competitor and µo
for the incumbent. That means that each one has a diﬀerent relaxation cost of the market constraint of one
unit.
To solve this problem, we use the Khun and Tucker’s conditions. We at ﬁrst consider constraint C1 and
add in a second step constraint C2. This solution allows us to ﬁnd without complication diﬀerent zones where
operators play one equilibrium. Four equilibriums are solutions of this maximization program. They depend
on parameters α, Ko and r. These parameters deﬁne zones where multipliers take diﬀerent values. We can
represent these equilibriums in a (Ko,α) graph, for a given r (ﬁgure 1). We can have all diﬀerent cases with
the variation of r. Finally, we obtain four diﬀerent areas where one equilibrium can be played by the two ﬁrms.
6Our results always exist with a more general linear demand function P(q)=a−bq with a>0 and b>0. But, because of small
values of q, some of them only exist with an elastic demand.
4Proposition 1. For any given r, the plane deﬁned by (Ko,α) with α ∈ [0,1] can be split into parts according







αKo − r. (3)
Under this curve the competitor is constrained by the gas release supply, thus its strategy is qκ
e = αKo.A b o v e
this curve, it is no longer constrained and able to play its best reply function to the quantity proposed by the
incumbent on the ﬁnal market.
Proposition 2. Each of the two zones deﬁned by λe =0can be split again according to the market constraint
(C2), i.e. according to the curves deﬁned by µκ
o =0with
µκ
o =1+αKo − 2Ko (4)
f o rt h el o w e rz o n e( λe > 0)a n db yb µo =0with
b µo = −3Ko +2− r − b µe (5)
and b µe ≥ 0 f o rt h eu p p e rz o n e( λe < 0). On the left sides of these curves, the market constraint is active
whereas on the right side it is not.
Depending on the values of α, Ko and r, four kinds of equilibriums are possible.
First one: the two constraints are binding which implies λe > 0 and µκ
o > 0. The equilibrium strategies are







o =( 1− α)Ko
(6)
In the zone where this equilibrium can be reached (zone 1a in the ﬁgure 1), the incumbent’s supplies Ko are
too small to make the two constraints inactive. Both players want to sell its maximum quantity, i.e. αKo for
the competitor and (1 − α)Ko for the incumbent.
Second one: only the C1 constraint is active (λe > 0). Within this zone, α is too small to allow the competitor
to play its best-reply function; its best strategy is playing its maximum quantity. The incumbent, because of
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FIG. 1 Four equilibrium zones











Third one: only the market constraint is binding (C2). This zone (2 in the ﬁgure 1) is characterized
by a multiplicity of equilibriums. This multiplicity has been demonstrated by Breton and Zaccour (2001).




b qe =2 Ko + b µo − 1
b qo =1− b µo − Ko
(8)
with b µo = −3Ko+2−r−b µe and b µe > 0. We select one of these equilibriums by setting b µe =0 . For gas industries,
this choice is relevant insofar as the incumbent is in charge of the obligation of supply, the competitor puts no
value on relaxing the market constraint. In this area, α is high enough to make constraint C1 inactive but the
market constraint remains active because of the small incumbent’s supplies.
Fourth one : none of the two constraints is binding. The two operators can play their best-reply function.













When gas release programs are implemented in a country, gas release quantities are often totally sold.7 Thus,
the gas release constraint is often active. The explanation is very intuitive : the gas release gives to competitors
an easier access to natural gas supplies at a more competitive price.





.I fr ≥ 1
2,t h e nqc
e ≤ 0. In addition, the zones
1a and 1b disappear. Only zones 2 and 3 remain in the (Ko,α)p l a n ef o rag i v e nr. But, as qc
e ≤ 0, the Cournot
equilibrium is not a feasible one. Then, only the zone of multiple equilibriums can be reach. We will assume in





.I fKo > 2
3 − 1
3r and r>1
2, then the competitor does not buy any quantity and the
incumbent is in a monopoly situation. In this case, the regulator does not implement a gas release program.
The three curves λe =0 , µκ
o =0and b µo =0deﬁne our diﬀerent areas. We can see they will depend on
variables α,Ko and r. They are decreasing functions of r, except µκ
o =0that is constant in r. If r increases, λe =0
and b µo =0move towards the origin of axes. The three curves (µκ
o =0 , b µo =0and λe =0 ) are respectively
the frontier of the market constraint activity and the competitor constraint activity. The intersection point of




2−r )f o r
ag i v e nr. They are decreasing functions of r. If r increases, the point A is moving towards the origin of axes
a n di ti sa l w a y so nc o n s t a n tc u r v eµκ
o =0 . In the following section we will consider that the regulator ﬁxes the
input price to its unitary cost, i.e. r = u. Then, according the proﬁt it can obtain with the diﬀerent zones, the
incumbent could have incentives to let its cost u grow in order to move from one zone to another one. Indeed,
the incumbent proﬁt is determined by two kinds of revenues : ﬁrst by sales on ﬁnal market, second by input
sales to its competitor.
Let its cost grow has then two eﬀects : it increases its own supply costs and decreases the competitor’s input
purchases; it can sell a higher quantity at a greater or at a constant price on the ﬁnal market.
3. INCENTIVES TO RAISE COST
7If it is not, it’s because exogenous contraints exist in the gas market, like diﬃcult and complex acces to transport facilities for
example.
7To identify the incentives to manipulate cost that the incumbent could have, we must explicit the incumbent’s
proﬁts according the four zones deﬁned previously using (1) combined with (6) to (9) .
Zone 1a (C1 and C2 binding):
Πκ
o(u)=Ko − αKo − K2
o + αK2
o + uαKo − Kou (10)












o + αKou − Kou (11)
Zone 2 (C2 binding):
b Πo(u)=3 Ko − 1+2 u − 2K2
o − 3Kou − u2 (12)











u2 − Kou (13)
A sm e n t i o n e da b o v e ,a ni n c r e a s eo fu leads to a move of the curves (λe =0and b µo =0 )d e ﬁned in the
(Ko,α) plan towards the origin of axis. If it let its cost u grow, the incumbent could thus move from zone 1a to
zone 2, from zone 2 to zone 3 and from 1b to 3. It could have such incentives to raise its cost in order to raise
its proﬁt.
3.1. Intra zone incentives
Proposition 3. As long as the gas release constraint is binding, then the incumbent has no incentive to
raise its cost.
Proof. Relations (10) and (12) indicate that, within zone 1a and 1b, proﬁts are decreasing function of the
unitary cost of supply u. Indeed, the competitor sells αKo and the incumbent can sell wether (1 − α)Ko or
1
2 − 1
2αKo depending on the market constraint. That implies that an increase of u has no eﬀect on the supply
cost of the competitor or on the market price. The only eﬀect is on the incumbent’s supply costs.





Ko.( 1 4 )
8Depending on the initial value of u, the incumbent will have incentive to let its cost increase or decrease in
order to reach u∗
2.8








Ko.( 1 5 )
Having u∗
3 positive implies Ko < 5
9. Or, relation (5) implies that to be in zone 3, the quantity hold by the
i n c u m b e n th a v et ob es u c ha sKo > 5
7. These two conditions are incompatible which means that the incumbent’s
proﬁt is a decreasing function of the supply cost u.
Proposition 4. If the gas release constraint is not binding and if the market constraint is active, then the
incumbent could have incentives to let its cost grow, depending on the initial values of this cost and of parameters
α and Ko.
Proof. Relation 12 indicates that within zone 2, the incumbent’s proﬁt is increasing function of u for u<u ∗
2.
Thus, if initial value of u is such that u<u ∗
2,t h e na ni n c r e a s eo fu until u∗
2 implies an increase of the incumbent’s
proﬁt. This result is independant of elasticity but it is quite high if demand is elastic.
An increase in u reduces the quantity sold by the competitor (b qe) and thus the quantity the latter buy
from the incumbent. For the incumbent, this increase raises the quantity it can sell to the ﬁnal customers. So,
the increase in revenues generated by the rise of the sell on the ﬁnal market overcomes the loss generated by
the decrease of the quantity sold to the competitor and ﬁn a l l yt h ei n c r e a s ei nu leads to an increase of the
incumbent’s proﬁt.
3.2. Inter zone incentives
By letting u grow, the incumbent could move from zone 1a to zone 2. The threshold value of u is given by









8This values can be reach only if 1
3 ≤ Ko < 2
3.
9If its unitary cost places the incumbent in zone 2, a rise of this cost could bring him in zone 3. The threshold
value is given by (5). Let u2 be this threshold value given by b µo(u)=0 .W eo b t a i n
u2 =2− 3Ko (17)
.
So, insofar as parameters Ko and α make it possible, the incumbent’s proﬁt can be written as follow,
Πo(u)=

      
      
Πκ
o(u) if 0 <u≤ u1
b Πo(u) if u1 <u≤ u2
Πc
o(u) if u2 <u<1
2
.







o (u) if 0 <u≤ u1
Πc
o(u) if u1 <u<1
2
. We can now determine how Πo(u) and Π0
o(u) evolve with u in
order to identify any incentive for the incumbent to let its cost increase.
Recalling relations (10) to (13), it appears that Πκ
o(u) is decreasing and b Πo(u) is increasing for 0 <u<u ∗
2.
So, depending on the initial value of u (let note this value u0) there might be an incentive for the incumbent to
move from zone 1a to zone 2.
To identify the values of Ko and α for which u∗
2 exists, we must compare this value with u1.I no t h e rw o r d s ,
couple (Ko,α) should be such as u∗
2 − u1 > 0.
If, starting from zone 1a, an incentive to increase cost exists, then there exist positive value δ>0 such as
b Πo(u0 +δ) −Πκ
o(u0) > 0 where u0 is the initial value such as 0 <u 0 ≤ u1. The diﬀerence b Πo(u0 +δ)− Πκ
o(u0)
is a concave function in δ. It is positive for δ such as δ1 <δ<δ 2 where δ1 = −3




2Ko +1− u0 +
√
Φ and Φ = −Ko (4(1 − Ko − u0)(1 − α) − Ko).
The values δ1 and δ2 and therefore the incentive to move from zone 1a to zone 2 exist if Φ > 0. Φ is an




Finally, the couples (Ko,α) should verify three conditions in order to allow an incentive for the incumbent
to let its cost grow (cf. ﬁgure 2, p.11): b Πo(u) must have an increasing part, that is to say u∗
2 −u1 > 0 ((Ko,α)
l o c a t e do nt h el e f to ft h ec u r v eu∗
2 − u1 =0 ); u1 − ui > 0 (above the curve u1 − ui =0 ); u1 > 0 : λe < 0 for
u =0(above the curve u1 =0 ):a st h ei n i t i a lv a l u eo fu have to be such as λe > 0, then the incentives to raise
u i no r d e rt om o v ef r o mz o n e1 at o2c a no n l yb ef o u n df o rc o u p l e s(Ko,α) located under the curve u1 =0 .
10FIG. 2 Interzones incentives
Finally, the only region where incentives for the incumbent to let its own cost grow exist is between point
B and C and above the curve u1 − ui =0on ﬁgure 2, i.e. for high values of α (5
6 ≤ α<1) and relatively low
values of Ko (0 <K o ≤ 2
5).
In addition to these three conditions, we can distinguish between cases where ui ≤ 0 and cases where ui > 0.
If ui ≤ 0 (couples (Ko,α) located above the curve ui =0on ﬁgure 2), then whatever the initial value of the
u n i t a r yc o s ti s ,t h e r ei sa ni n c e n t i v ef o rm o v i n gf r o mz o n e1 at oz o n e2 .I fui > 0 (couples (Ko,α) located under
the curve ui =0on ﬁgure 2), then the incentive to let the unitary cost grow will exist only for initial value of
this cost such as u0 >u i. In other words, if the initial value of the unitary cost is relative low (u0 ≤ ui), then
the incumbent will prefer reducing its cost rather than letting them grow.
Proposition 5. If the input capacity hold by the incumbent is quite limited and if the gas release proportion
is high, then it could have an incentive to let its unitary supply cost grow in order to switch from a situation
where the market constraint and the competitor constraint are binding towards a situation where only the market
constraint is active.
The ﬁgure 2 deﬁnes the values of the parameters such as, starting from zone 1a, higher proﬁts in zone 2 can
11be obtained by an increase of unitary cost of supply (u).
There could not be other incentives of this kind because from zone 2 to zone 3 (ﬁgure 1, p. 6), or from zone
1b to zone 3, proﬁts are continuous and decreasing in u.
Proposition 6. For small values of α, the incumbent has always incentives to be eﬃcient, regardless of the
elasticity of demand.
Proof. For small values of α, there are no inter or intra incentives. For a linear demand, elasticity is small for
high values of q (in our model, for high values of Ko). There are no incentives for smaller values of α regardless
of Ko values.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In order to identify the incentives that an incumbent in gas industry could receive if it is submitted to a gas
release program, we propose a model where an incumbent has to be the supplier of its competitor at a regulated
price. We show that four kinds of equilibriums can be obtained depending on the ﬁxed capacity of input hold
by the incumbent and the share of this capacity that it has to oﬀer to its competitor. This share of capacity
is exogenously deﬁned by the regulator and the price set to the unitary cost. In a second step, we show that,
in most of the cases, the incumbent’s proﬁt is a decreasing function of its unitary cost of supply. But there are
some cases (low capacity and high share of released input) where it could have an incentive to let its cost grow
in order to raise its cost. In these cases the strategic eﬀect of raising the cost overcomes the direct eﬀect of
reducing proﬁts.
This model ﬁts to the worries raised by European gas release programs. As incumbents in European gas
industries are linked to extra European producers by long term contracts, their supplies can be considered as
ﬁxed and they can only have a leverage on the cost by renegotiation rather than on the capacity. In most of
the cases in Europe, long term contracts correspond to end-users demand and the share of gas that had to be
released by the incumbents vary from 3% to 5%. So there is a very limited risk to that these release programs
had lead to an incentive similar to the one we discover.
As regulators are supposed to look for the maximum welfare, one extension of our paper could the identiﬁ-
cation of the optimal share of input that an incumbent has to oﬀer to its competitor.
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